Will Ma Ying-jeou’s Disappearing Legacy be that of Richard III?

Jerome F. Keating Ph.D.

“Stupid is as stupid does?” “Hypocritical is as hypocritical does?” “Ruthless is as ruthless does?” These are just some of the many ways that Ma Ying-jeou’s recent “assassination” attack on Wang Jin-pyng is being questioned and interpreted. Regardless of what explanation wins out, and whether Wang is found guilty or not, few will dispute that this past week is proving disastrous for Ma. As an unpopular lame duck president with little over two years left, once Ma chose to strike Wang, a member loyal to Ma’s own party, Ma needed to finish him off with the first blow. He did not. Thus, not only have Wang and his supporters and followers had time to regroup and gain allies, but Ma has also drawn an irrevocable battle line for those within the party. The attack has been made too serious; they will have to choose sides. To make matters worse, those outside the party who have long questioned Ma’s capability and motives can sense the blood of Ma’s wounded and exposed position; he will get no help there.  

Peace within and without the party will be impossible in the upcoming two years. Yet peace is what Ma, now proven untrustworthy, needs to find in some form to rescue any chance of his fast souring and diminishing legacy. No, there will not be peace. And even worse, Ma’s support circle of loyal, idealistic but too often incompetent boy scout followers will be getting smaller and smaller. What capable person would join that team with Ma losing power in two years? To borrow from an old Texas saying, they have been drinking their own bathwater and calling it champagne for too long; few will now want to share their beverage.

The time of reckoning and accountability has come for this attack has been clearly and visibly all Ma. In the past Ma had always been able to claim a distanced high road and/or to deflect and shift the blame for his actions to others including his followers. Here, regardless of what one thinks of Wang and his capabilities and role, Wang did not deserve this treatment, but Ma has proven relentless in trying to make the blade stick. Not even Ma’s traditional hatchet man, King Pu-tsun, a. k. a. “King the knife” has been seen to have had any influence; this is Ma’s vendetta and over what seems to be a fabricated tempest.

Since Ma’s Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has had so many members recently found guilty of corruption and there has hardly been a word of party reprimand or shock. It blows the mind that Premier Jung Yi-huah will quote Ma as saying that this time Wang had crossed the president’s “red line” even before any trial and defense. So many far worse “red lines” have already been crossed in the past that the alleged offense of Wang, pales in comparison and the public can only wonder. That sense of wonder is especially increased as the public remember incidents like how Ma’s secretary took the blame for putting approximately a half million US dollars into Ma’s personal bank account when Ma was Mayor of Taipei. That man was welcomed back to the party and given a job as soon as he got out of prison. Ironically, Wang no doubt had even helped in the cleansing of Ma’s reputation at that time. Yet here the attempted destruction of Wang is sought before a trial and for alleged crimes that are questionable and with perhaps “illegally” acquired evidence.

The court case of Wang has not even started and the casualties and body count have begun to mount. The former Minister of Justice, Tseng Yung-fu has apparently been forced to resign though Premier Jiang claims that there was no pressure. Lo Chih-chiang, the deputy secretary of the Presidential Office has also resigned citing that the mounting pressures of his job and the need to “spend more time with his family.” As this drags out, many more will fall perhaps on both sides before any resolution is achieved.

For many of the public, the imagistic veil that once cloaked Ma’s visage is finally being lifted and Ma’s true character is coming out. Despite whatever apparent nostalgic efforts that Ma may have in wanting to unify Taiwan with China, he is not a Chiang Kai-shek and he is not a Mao Tse-tung. Even if he were, he lives in different times, in a different place and with different circumstances. He is not in China; he is in Taiwan a democracy where the past tactics of Mao will not work and the militaristic efforts of Chiang eventually failed. To further move the comparison to the present, Wang is not a Bo Xilai and his guilt, if any, cannot be dispensed of in the same way, as was that of Bo.

There will be plenty of metaphors and examples to illustrate Ma’s current position as this plays out and as Ma contemplates both what chances he has for a reputable legacy and what he can make of a “diminished thing.” In Shakespeare’s play Richard III, King Richard after having dispatched several of his enemies, finds himself on Bosworth battlefield bereft of allies; he then utters the well-known line, “A horse, a horse, my kingdom for a horse.” For Ma, that line may seem not only ironic, but also ludicrous.